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DDAS Accident Report
Accident details
Report date: 17/03/2004

Accident number: 244

Accident time: 07:45

Accident Date: 09/08/1998

Where it occurred: Shorandam, Kandahar
Primary cause: Unavoidable (?)

Country: Afghanistan
Secondary cause: Inadequate equipment
(?)

Class: Excavation accident

Date of main report: 01/02/1999

ID original source: none

Name of source: MAPA/UNOCHA

Organisation: Name removed
Mine/device: PMN AP blast

Ground condition: grass/grazing area
hard

Date record created: 17/02/2004

Date last modified: 17/02/2004

No of victims: 1

No of documents: 2

Map details
Longitude:

Latitude:

Alt. coord. system:

Coordinates fixed by:

Map east:

Map north:

Map scale: not recorded

Map series:

Map edition:

Map sheet:

Map name:

Accident Notes
inconsistent statements (?)
long handtool may have reduced injury (?)
partner's failure to "control" (?)
request for machine to assist (?)
use of pick (?)
visor not worn or worn raised (?)
inadequate investigation (?)
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Accident report
An investigation on behalf of the UN MAC was carried out and its report made available in
September 1999. The following summarises its content.
At the time of the accident the demining group was using a one-man drill and two-man
teams.
The victim had been a deminer for eight years. He had last been on leave 15 days before
and last attended a revision course seven days before. The accident occurred on ground
described as "grazing and residential" land in "medium hard" condition. The mine was
identified from pieces found at the site.
The investigators found that the victim was investigating a detector reading in a squatting
position and using a pick. He had used two markers. He "finished one layer" [presumably
slicing layers from the ground] and rechecked with the detector. The reading was still there
so he started excavating again without placing any markers. He hit a mine at 07:45.
The accident investigators reported that he was not injured because he was wearing
protection. [See “Related papers”.]
The victim's visor was broken and his pick was damaged.
The Team sub-commander said that the mine was very deep and victim made a mistake
placing the marks.
The Section Leader said that the hardness of the ground may have contributed to the
incident, that the victim may have placed the marks poorly, and that he sustained "superficial
injuries" and deafness. He thought that back-hoes might help prevent such incidents.

Conclusion
The investigators concluded that the accident occurred because the victim was using
unauthorised drills and equipment. His field supervision was poor. They acknowledged that
the mine may have been deeply buried but thought that problem "could have been
overcome" with the use of correct procedures.

Recommendations
The investigators recommended a return to the three-marks procedure for indicating detector
readings pending a re-evaluation of the two-mark method. They further recommended that
the Section Leader be disciplined and demoted. They added that the accident illustrated the
advantage of wearing visors and jackets because the victim was uninjured and should be
referenced in training courses. [See “Related papers”.] They added that the quality of the
visor should be examined, pointing out that it had "broken into pieces".

Victim Report
Victim number: 318

Name: Name removed
Gender: Male

Age:
Status: deminer

Fit for work: presumed

Compensation: not made available

Time to hospital: not recorded

Protection issued: Frag jacket

Protection used: Frag jacket, Helmet,
Thin, short visor

Helmet
Thin, short visor
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Summary of injuries:
INJURIES
minor Arms
minor Head
severe Hearing
COMMENT
See medical report.

Medical report
An initial casualty report described the victim's injuries as: "Head (frontal area) superficial
wounds and left and right arm superficial multiple wounds. Both ears have deafness." The
victim's vital signs were a pulse of 80/min, BP of 120/80 and Respiration of 18/min.
The casualty report included a medic's sketch on which a left shoulder and forehead
laceration and hearing damage were indicated. [A doctor's report from the field hospital was
not translated - the failure to translate it being unique among the recent records at this UN
MAC].
An initial accident report sent to the UN MAC reported that the victim sustained minor head
and arm injuries, along with severe hearing loss. That report also mentioned that the victim
was treated on site and taken to the ICRC hospital in Kandahar, then returned to the field
medical unit. [The investigators did not mention the ICRC or the injuries recorded by the field
medic.]

Analysis
The primary cause of this accident is listed as “Unavoidable” because it is possible that the
victim was working as directed by his organization when the accident occurred. If the victim
were working with his visor raised, that would represent a "Field control inadequacy"
because his error was not corrected by his partner or his field supervisors.
The failure of the victim's thin (3mm) visor probably indicates that it had hardened with age
and the failure to replace it was management's responsibility. The secondary cause is listed
as “Inadequate equipment”.
The difference between the initial injury report and the investigator's findings is profound leading one to wonder whether the investigators took so long to conduct their inquiry (their
report was stamped 1st February 1999 - almost six months later) that the demining group
decided to make light of the accident by pretending that the victim (who's injuries were
minor) had not been injured at all. It seems unlikely that he would have been taken to the
ICRC hospital if he had not been injured.
Whether or not the demining group decided to make light of the injuries, it seems that the
accident investigators may have suppressed parts of the available information in order to
make an argument supporting the use of visors and frag-jackets. They ignored the initial
report of injury, made little of the shattered visor, and failed to get the field doctor's report
translated. These do not promote confidence in their objective assessment of the accident.

Related papers
Sketch maps of the accident site were included in the accident file.
A photograph of the victim's visor showed it in four pieces. It is possible that these caused
his forehead laceration.

3

Documents were not made available for copying.
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